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INFLATION: A GLOBAL ENIGMA
ARTHUR M. KREIDMANN*
Inflation is describable in different ways:
A Dictionary Meaning
"Inflationis an increase in the volume of money and credit relative
to available goods resulting in a substantial and continuing rise in
the general price level - contrasted with deflation."'
Economics Parlance
The currently accepted descriptions in economics parlance fall into
two categories: (1) demand-pull inflation, which connotes that too
much money is chasing too few goods, or (2) cost-push inflation,
which connotes that an increase of costs results in an increase in
prices.
An Analytic View
A leading economics adviser offers an explanation:
There is some average of the prices of all relevant goods and
services, what is often referred to as the 'price level.' If that aver-
age is increasing through time, then there is 'inflation,' and more
or less depending on how much the average is increasing per unit
of time. If the average is decreasing, then there is 'deflation.'
And if it is not changing, or is constant over time, then there is
'price stability.'
So the words 'inflation' and 'deflation' and the phrase 'price
stability' are all descriptive of the behavior of an average of
prices, not of any particular prices. Thus, price stability can ob-
tain when all prices are changing, as they will or should be when
demands and/or supplies are changing. Inflation can obtain
when some prices are decreasing and deflation when some prices
2are increasing.
The variety of definitions suggests the complexity of the prob-
lem. Inherent in the problem are many interrelated factors which
prompted a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
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serve System to state: "in this struggle against inflation, we shall
have to use all available options."3 To analyze inflation solely in
terms of balancing the budget and prudent monetary control is too
broad-brushed an analysis of a many-faceted problem. Similarly,
to point to the manifold increase of the price of oil since the 1973
Arab embargo as a significant cause of a spiraling inflation, al-
though true, loses sight of many other key contributing factors.
I. CURRENT VIEWS ON INFLATION
A wide range of economic events affects the steady rise in in-
flation. From the start of his Chairmanship of the Federal Reserve
Board, G. William Miller has asserted that the challenge of infla-
tion requires a cooperative effort among numerous constituencies:
the administration, Congress, the financial world, international
bankers, and the public. In numerous talks to the financial sectors
of the business world, labor, the public, and in reports to the media,
Miller has expressed his views and indicated his positions on the
various aspects of inflation.
Miller's approach does not vary in marked degree from the
thinking of his predecessor, Arthur Burns. Without attempting a
lengthy catalog of his position statements to date, a brief survey of
his major concerns will underscore the goals he seeks to attain.
Miller urges a balanced budget by 1982; he advocates a reduction
in federal expenditures over the next five years to 20% of the na-
tion's output of goods and services from the current 22%, a position
which has provoked political reactions nationwide; he envisions an
annual reduction in the inflation rate of 0.50% to 0.75% - a hope-
ful result from the totality of his recommendations; he encourages
an increase in business investment - new machinery, plant, and
equipment - over the next five years from the current 9% to 12% of
the gross national product, coupled with an increase in the invest-
ment tax credit; he favors a stimulus to increase housing starts by
75,000 to 100,000 units over five years; in this vein, Miller endorses
higher interest rates payable by savings banks as a means to dis-
courage the shift of savings to higher yielding fixed-income security
investments, thereby maintaining an acceptable mortgage interest
rate; he recommends tax reductions for business and individuals,
and encourages efforts to ease the drag of federal regulations on
economic activity; he encourages an increase in exports from 7% to
3. Henry C. Wallich, Moving in For a Soft Landing, George C. Eccles Lecture Series,
Utah State University (Feb. 9, 1978).
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10% of the gross national product.4
Additionally, Miller initially proposed a two-year deferral of
the next scheduled minimum wage increase from the current rate of
$2.65 an hour to $2.90 an hour, coupled with lower minimum
wages for teenagers. He would defer the proposed tax cut from
October 1, 1978 to January 1, 1979 which would result in an addi-
tional $8-9 billion gain in revenues. He would implement his rec-
ommendations to encourage the installation of new machinery,
plant, and equipment with a schedule of accelerated depreciation
lives to encourage business to invest. This plan calls for five years
for depreciating business equipment, ten years for depreciating
plants, and twenty years for depreciating office buildings - his pri-
mary concern being to encourage investment and to diminish con-
sumption.5 All this, of course, would require legislation.6 Most
importantly, he leans against the potential swelling of the money
supply. His primary purpose in setting moderate ranges for in-
creases of the money supply is to effect reasonable price stability.
Overall, he is very aware that the Federal Reserve Board cannot
cure the inflation problem by unilateral action. Nevertheless,
Miller periodically makes recommendations that affect the business
community in the hope that the recommendations of the Federal
Reserve Board will serve as a curative catalytic agent.
The concerned corps of informed advisors - economists, ana-
lysts, business chieftains, and others involved in the search for the
causes and cures of inflation - would readily agree that there is no
quick panacea. An attempt to arrange an order of priority by pin-
pointing the causes and formulating the cures would be an ideal
approach. However, because of the urgency of the problem which
confronts not only the United States but the rest of the world, there
is a compelling need to place all relevant factors on the analysis
board. Such a modus operandi might result in a fruitful mix of ef-
4. Levine, Independent Force: Fed Chairman Miller Wins Power by Seizing on Inflation
Issue, Wall St. J., June 21, 1978, at 1, col. 6. See also Henry C. Walich, Honest Money,
Commencement Address to the Fordham Graduate School of Business (June 28, 1978). Sec-
retary of Commerce Juanita Kreps has been the Carter administration's spokesperson en-
couraging United States manufacturers to sell abroad. She has spoken frequently before
many groups in furtherance of improving the United States trade deficit by significantly
increasing exports. U.S. DEFT. COMMERCE NEWS (Apr. 13, 1978); Id (May 25, 1978); Id
(June 14, 1978); Id (July 26, 1978).
5. Fed Chairman Urges Congress to Delay Minimum Wage Increase, Wall St. J., June
30, 1978, at 6, col. 4.
6. Miller Confirms Credit Was Tightened, Pledges Restraint' in Monetary Policy, Wall
St. J., Apr. 26, 1978, at 3, col. 2.
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forts which could help to solve the inflation problem. Chairman
Miller has dramatically posed the challenge to the administration
and Congress for a faster depreciation of plant and equipment in
language readily understood by those engaged in running a busi-
ness. He stated that this technique would get "the biggest bang for
the buck."7 The result would be to create employment without in-
flation. Legislation would be required for this purpose, a crucial
fact which highlights the need for Congressional action and cooper-
ation.
Even more ambitious than Miller is George Soros, a writer on
economic subjects. Mr. Soros recommends a depreciation schedule
that would start with 150% of the cost of new investment and grad-
ually return to the present 100% over a period of years.8 One of the
effects of such a program would be to reduce or eliminate the origi-
nally proposed $25 billion tax cut. Without such a new incentive, a
recession looms as the undesirable alternative to bring relief from
inflation; it is generally anticipated, absent available, workable op-
tions, that a recession is likely to start in the first half of 1979. 9
Ironically, it is predicted that when the recession comes the dollar
will strengthen, price pressures will abate, interest rates will drop,
and the stock market will go through the roof. The gist of Mr.
Soros' idea is to couple a stimulation of the economy with a cut in
the budget deficit. Since a higher level of economic activity would
contribute to tax revenue, investment and consumption will be en-
hanced. The stimulus to the economy by an accelerated deprecia-
tion schedule as compared with a tax cut may be viewed in the
following manner: a tax cut in the originally planned and now re-
duced amount spread over a population exceeding 200 million is
like sprinkling artifical rain to nurture crops which need prolonged
and bountiful rainfall.
An increase in the tax investment credit is often mentioned as
a supplemental aid directed toward encouraging capital investment
by business. The prevalent opinion among economists and tax spe-
cialists is that although the increased tax credit initially reduces the
amount of collectible revenue, the resultant business expansion and
7. Miller, Urging a Balanced Budget, Backs Tighter Fiscal Relaxed Monetary Policy,
Wall St. J., May 12, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
8. Soros, 150% Depreciation Could Do It All, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1978, at 14F, col. 3.
9. But see U.S. Not Heading For Recession, Int'l Herald Tribune, Sept. 15, 1978, at 9,
col. 6 (Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal recently told a group of business and govern-
ment leaders that there is no chance the United States will slide into another recession during
the remainder of President Carter's first term, a view with obvious political overtones).
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technological improvement ultimately bring about higher employ-
ment and increased productivity.
The urgency of solving the inflation problem head on has
evoked other frontal attacks. These assaults are leveled at aspects
of the economy which bear on curbing the rising rate of inflation.
For example, the now abandoned notion of wage-price controls
tried during the Nixon administration has yielded to the acronym
TIP, which stands for Tax-Based Incomes Policy. This policy relies
on tax incentives and disincentives. Senator William Proxmire,
Democrat of Wisconsin, said in a news conference that despite the
shortcomings of TIP, the policy "is the only game in town." Al-
though TIP has many variants, it would operate as follows: the gov-
ernment would announce wage increase guideposts for the next
calendar year and publish a tax incentive plan schedule. At the end
of the year, companies would pay a tax according to the schedule if
wage increases exceeded the government's guideposts. By contrast,
they would receive a subsidy - a negative tax - if the wage in-
creases were below the guideposts. It would act directly only on
wage inflation. Opponents of TIP emphasize the fact that it consti-
tutes an excise tax on labor, that the resultant reduction in employ-
ment would lead to fewer goods being offered on the market, and
that higher prices would be charged.
An outspoken critic of TIP is Preston Miller, Associate Direc-
tor of Research for the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
However, the compelling challenge of rising inflation should wel-
come even criticizable efforts on a trial basis in line with Senator
Proxmire's desperate exhortation that "it is the only game in town."
The concept of a tax incentive-disincentive incomes policy exempli-
fied by TIP has received strong support from Professor James
Tobin of Yale. Tobin claims that one of the President's biggest
mistakes was to abandon an incomes policy to allay business and
labor's suspicions of a new Democratic administration. In fact,
Tobin considers an incomes policy as one of only three effective
alternatives to extricate the economy from the morass of inflation
- the other two being the risk of feeding an increased inflation and
the slowing of the economy by the administration and the Federal
Reserve Board.' 0 Another ardent supporter of TIP is Kathleen M.
Cooper, Chief Economist of the United Banks of Colorado, who
believes in the Arthur M. Okun plan to provide tax incentives to
10. Silk, Why Carter Holds Firm on Tax-Cut Package, N.Y. Times, May 2, 1978, at 51,
col. 1.
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hold down wages and price increases. Cooper prefers wage rather
than price guidelines because of the difficulty of administering
price guidelines due to the numerous elements that feed into the
pricing structure. Her opinion is that if wages slow down, prices
will slow down." TIP, however, has been somewhat overtaken by
wage-price guidelines. 2
Perhaps the most direct anti-inflation remedy is a tax reduc-
tion. In this vein, the Kemp-Roth Bill' 3 was introduced in the Con-
gress. It was argued that the bill would have permitted the
taxpayer to avoid the "double whammy" created by inflation and a
progressive income tax. In support of the Bill it was argued that a
substantial tax cut - a 33% cut for individuals over the next three
years - would be conducive to economic growth, and that the gov-
ernment's revenues would eventually increase to such an extent as
to make the budgetary deficit of negligible concern. Irving Kristol,
a New York University Professor who supported the tax reduction
approach, describes the notion as a "[plopulist remedy for populist
abuses."" Professor Kristol's view was that the Kemp-Roth Bill
was a companion to California's Proposition 13, which dramatized
the start of the tax cut movement. A program of tax reduction to
slow the rise of the inflationary spiral is finding widespread support
and includes among its supporters Juanita Kreps, Secretary of
Commerce. '5
The contemplated annual reduction of the budget requires the
elimination of many expenditures, following a thorough study of
budgetary items that can be reduced or eliminated. A reduced
budget is attended by difficulties. The obvious obstacles are the
built-in allocations absolutely needed for a highly industrialized so-
ciety, the expected resistance of members of Congress who are fear-
ful of stormy reactions from their respective constituencies, and the
constitutional mandate that the federal government is charged with
responsibility for the national defense. The federal outlays for de-
11. Mullaney, Economic Scene.- The Evolution of an Economist, N.Y. Times, July 14,
1978, at D2, col. 1.
12. The wage-price guidelines concept and program are discussed infra pp. 373-76.
13. H.R. 8333, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. H 7171 (1977).
14. Kristol, Populist Remedyfor Populist Abuses, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1978, at 20, col. 4.
See also Miller, Tax-Cut Plan Gives GOP a New Issue-And a New Face, Wall St. J., Sept.
19, 1978, at 1, col. 4; Senate Panel Rejects GOP Bid/or 33% Tax Cut, Wall St. J., Sept. 19,
1978, at 2, col. 2.
15. Real' GNP Slidin First Quarter on Strike, Snow, Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 1978, at 3, col.
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fense will total $111.7 billion next year, estimated' to be approxi-
mately 5% of the gross national product for 1979. 16 With the need
for increased technological advances in military equipment, this
item of the budget necessarily will increase with the years. Of sig-
nificance in this connection is that United States defense expendi-
tures have declined in ten years from 9% of the GNP to slightly less
than 5%. 17 However, the lingering reminder remains: Chairman
Miller emphasizes the need to balance the budget by 1982 as a nec-
essary condition for fighting inflation. Additionally, he is joining
the frontal attack brigade and has made various suggestions along
these lines. For example, he has urged the administration to con-
sider an "anti-inflation" tax on excess profits as part of a "second
stage" of the battle against inflation. He has advised, in a drastic
change from his previously stated position, that tax cuts for individ-
uals in 1979 be abandoned in favor of a deferral of the social secur-
ity tax increase scheduled for next January. Miller has also
advanced other measures which have been the subject of study and
recommendations by the host of writers and spokesmen who have
joined the fight against inflation. An examination of some basic




Productivity, which is defined as the average output per hour
of labor, is a major part of the inflation problem. Through the
1950's and most of the 1960's, productivity rose at the rate of nearly
3% a year. In the years after 1968, the trend dropped to half that
rate. Since late 1976 it has been almost flat. 8 A corollary to the
drop in productivity is the twin phenomena of inflation and low-
ered unemployment. The nation's output over the past year was
increased by putting more people on the payroll rather than by im-
proving each person's capacity to produce. The explanation for di-
minishing productivity is varied. Some say they do not know why
it has stopped rising. Others claim that it is attributable to the low
rates at which business has been investing new capital, a fact which
16. Malabre, Tracking a Trend- Military Outlays Play Smaller Economic Role but Turn-
around, Fueling Inflation, Is Likely, Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1978, at 38, col. 1.
17. Id.
18. Productivity in the U.S., Int'l Herald Tribune, Aug. 1, 1978, at 6, col. 1.
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may be the result of low profits and the uncertainty of the business
climate. Still another view is that the cost of new environmental
and safety regulations, which requires industry to invest heavily in
equipment to control air and water pollution, has imposed heavy
burdens on business which, in turn, affects its capacity to improve
productivity performance.
Among some of the major industrial powers, increases in pro-
ductivity in manufacturing for the decade of 1967-77 are revealing:
United States - 27%; France - 72%; West Germany - 70%; Italy
- 62%; Japan - 107%; Canada - 43%; and Great Britain -
27%.19 It is apparent that the United States and Great Britain are
on the lowest rung of the productivity ladder. Barry Bosworth, Di-
rector of the Council on Wage and Price Stability (CWPS), con-
cedes that the administration is not certain why productive growth
has been so slow.20 It is often stated among administration officials
that the major drawbacks on productivity are the increasing regula-
tory burdens on business, particularly on the environmental level
for new plants. When productivity grows slowly or declines, infla-
tion worries are heightened. With wages rising while output per
hour falls, the cost of production increases, putting pressure on
prices. Most recent surveys indicate that businessmen, conscious of
uncertainties caused by inflation, are conservative in their capital
spending plans.2'
Inflation itself may work to retard gains in productivity be-
cause it may discourage long-term investment, which is the type of
capital spending needed to enhance productivity research and im-
prove technology. The higher the rate of inflation, the higher the
rate of insecurity and hence the less technology a dollar will buy.
In short, inflation distorts investment incentives. It is said that
productivity figures usually follow the economic curve: in reces-
sions, productivity lags because production falls faster than workers
are laid off; in recovery, productivity climbs fast because output
picks up before the work force builds. Professor Dale Jorgenson of
Harvard University relates the soaring cost of energy to a winding
down of the economy, effectively slowing the substitution of pro-
ductivity-increasing capital for labor. 22 That is the reason the
19. Id.
20. Productivity Mightn't Increase in 1978, Adding Price Pressure, Carter Aide Says, Wall
St. J., July 21, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
21. Id.
22. Flint, Inflation-ProductiviAy Puzzle. Capital Outlays May Be Hurt, N.Y. Times, May
27, 1978, at 25, col. 3.
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return on capital formation is so slow and employment is growing
so rapidly. According to Professor Jorgenson there is no reversing
this trend for the next decade.
Professor Klein of the Wharton School recommends acceler-
ated depreciation and the investment tax credit to increase produc-
tivity, observing that a tax cut will result in additional productivity
by lowering the pressure for higher wages.23 The alternative is that,
if there is no tax cut and inflation continues to rise, a recession is
inevitable by early 1979. Kathleen M. Cooper, chief economist of
the United Banks of Colorado, has said: "until we pull down the
differential between high compensation and low productivity, we'll
never beat inflation."24 The academic economists generally, al-
though respectful of Chairman Miller's views and actions to date,
believe that he is oversimplifying the analysis of the problem by
giving high priority to lower federal spending and a smaller budget
deficit as the basic approach to reduce inflation. More recently,
Miller joined with Treasury Secretary Blumenthal to formulate and
spearhead an all-out effort to combat inflation.25
The word "stagflation" has been in vogue for some time. It is
sometimes defined as a mixture of economic stagnation and infla-
tion, which is tantamount to a coupling of a drop in productivity
and inflation.26 To date, management finds it difficult to offset ris-
ing wages and other costs with more efficient production. The only
course for management to take has been to switch from "cost offset-
ting" to "cost pass-along" strategy in order to maintain profits.
Thus, management has opted for cost-push inflation. Such man-
agement strategy really invites labor to demand wage increases.
The productivity problem is not peculiar to the United States.
It has prompted British economists to note that unless British in-
dustry can produce and sell the goods required to meet the demand,
the demand will be met by imports which will set inflation going
again; that is, it will create jobs in other countries rather than in
Britain.
Thus, the attack on the dragon of inflation must command the
resourceful efforts of all to approach the problem from different
23. Mullaney, Economic Scene: Wharton's Call: Fight Inflation, N.Y. Times, June 16,
1978, at D2, col. 1.
24. Mullaney, supra note 11.
25. This new effort is discussed infra pp. 366-68.
26. Silk, Economic Scene: The Origins of'Stagfiation, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1978, at D2,
col. I.
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directions. We are indeed fortunate to have among our academi-
cians, economists, analysts, and congressional leaders, people who
continue to come forward with fresh ideas in the hope that a combi-
nation of remedies will ultimately result in a cure.
B. Competition
Professor Walter Adams, Professor of Economics and past
President of Michigan State University, after reviewing many of the
alternatives which have been proposed to halt spiraling inflation,
concludes that the most attractive alternative is a vigorous competi-
tion policy.27 He recommends a dismantling of government pro-
grams that artificially stifle market forces and protect concentrated
industries from competition. He notes what the mere threat of de-
regulation and the aggressive promotion of competition by the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) has already done to airline rates
without causing losses to the carriers. He emphasizes that stopping
the drift of protectionism in international trade would have the
same effect. Since Professor Adams expressed his views, CAB has
put into effect a program permitting airlines to slash coach fares as
much as 50% below existing levels on all flights and as much as 70%
for off-hours flights. David M. Lilly, a member of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, recently remarked that
steps must be taken to improve competition among businesses
through increased emphasis on antitrust policy, changes in regula-
tory procedures, and an easing of barriers in international trade.
C Bias Toward Inflation
The government has contributed indirectly to the inflationary
trend in our economy in several important respects: (1) for many
years the federal government has virtually regulated various forms
of transportation, which has raised costs from 10% to 30%; (2) tariffs
and import barriers, although benefiting certain industries, have
served to increase prices of some commodities or to prevent a drop
in others; (3) agricultural price supports, restrictive building codes,
the market power of business and unions, pollution controls, safety
regulations, pension costs, mandatory retirement, and minimum
wage laws are all part of the economy's bias for inflation. For the
current year, new payroll taxes (social security and unemploy-
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ment insurance), new minimum wages, and proposed energy taxes
are calculated to cause a 1% increase in the rate of inflation; (4)
index price increases are synonymous with costs of living adjust-
ment formulae, and contract provisions containing such formulae
frequently have been called fuel for inflation. Indexing is viewed
by many as an unacceptable approach to inflation because it takes
away the incentive to fight the inflation itself; that is, it is an admis-
sion of defeat. Also involved in the indexing technique is a "pass-
along price-raising" way of life, a point which was made by Byung
Yoo Hong in his doctoral thesis at Columbia University, as distin-
guished from "cost-offsetting," which is considered preferable be-
cause under such a program the worker gets higher real wage
increases than under cost pass-along management;28 and (5) infla-
tion is one of the major causes of unemployment in the current
environment. It leads to sluggish buying, although there are those
who buy now in anticipation of higher prices later. Today's high
unemployment rate is the legacy of inflation. With respect to the
enumerated points mentioned above, ways must be found to reduce
unemployment while avoiding a new wave of inflation.
Several steps to slow down a spiraling inflation have been sug-
gested: (1) a prudent monetary and fiscal policy; (2) a realization
that prudent monetary and fiscal policy is not all that is required.
Inflation is more than an evil of the business cycle; it is a structural
phenomenon as well. The efficiency and flexibility of markets must
be improved, and structural changes in our economy will have to
be made. For example, improved competition, economic incentives
as substitutes for inefficient safety, and environmental regulations
which have been imposed on certain industries should be studied in
an effort to correlate their cost burdens with the reasonable needs of
the involved problem; (3) job training programs should be strength-
ened to increase productiveness of workers, particularly minorities
and teenagers; and (4) unemployment insurance laws which pro-
vide such generous benefits that the incentive to work is reduced,
should be reviewed.
Chairman Miller, to his credit, has recently expanded his fron-
tal attack to include most of the proposals made by the corps of
economists, analysts, academicians, and congressional leaders. The
inflationary bias of our economy should be scrutinized and meas-
ures taken to moderate its effect on a constantly increasing infla-
tion.
28. Silk, supra note 26.
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Just as an environmental impact statement is required as a
condition precedent to the siting and erection of a nuclear power
plant, we should require "inflation impact statements" to be signed
by a governmental agency relative to changes in the minimum
wage, import restrictions, and other practices and regulations that
predispose our economy to an inflationary bent. In this way, the
public would be awakened to the costs involved when new legisla-
tion is adopted and new procedures are instituted. An informed
and aroused citizenry could support some of the corrective meas-
ures to diminish inflation, which has become an insidious ingredi-
ent of our economic life.
D. The Money Supply
The virus of inflation is attributable to many factors. Note-
worthy is the fact that the rate of inflation is highest in a country
with the highest rate of growth of the money supply. Japan, by
slowing the growth rate of the money supply, reduced inflation de-
spite its oil and gas imports. Canada, by raising the growth rate of
the money supply, increased inflation despite its oil and gas ex-
ports.2 9
In March 1975, Congress passed Concurrent Resolution 113
stating the "sense of Congress" that the Federal Reserve should
"maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit aggregates
commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase
production .... -3o The Resolution also called on the Federal Re-
serve to consult with Congress periodically on its objectives and
plans with respect to the ranges of growth or diminution of mone-
tary and credit aggregates for the upcoming twelve months. The
Resolution was, in November of 1977, supplanted by largely paral-
lel language in the Federal Reserve Reform Act.31
Paul Volcker, President of the New York Federal Reserve
Bank, thinks that to deal with inflation one must focus not on
money targets alone, but that one must look behind the money sup-
ply to nonmonetary factors. However, he emphasizes the need for
"targeting" as a discipline on monetary authorities. He is of the
opinion that "inflation is difficult to eliminate because of forces
deeply imbedded in the structure of our economy, our social poli-
29. See Meltzer, Money Growth and Inflation, Wall St. J., May 17, 1978, at 22, col. 4.
30. H. Con. Res. 133, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 89 Stat. 1194 (1975).
31. Volcker, The Role of Monetary Targets in an Age of Inflation 1, Address delivered at
the Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association in New York (Dec. 30, 1977).
Vol. 9
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cies, and our political life."32
Monetary targets are set periodically by the Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC). These targets are set in terms of
ranges expressed in billions of dollars, and are described as money
stock measures and defined by the Federal Reserve System. The
five categories of the money stock measures include the following:
(1) M 1,3 which includes demand deposits at all commercial banks
other than those due to domestic commercial banks and the United
States government, less cash items in the process of collection and
Federal Reserve float; foreign demand balances at Federal Reserve
banks; and currency outside the treasury, Federal Reserve banks,
and vaults of all commercial banks; (2) M2, which includes, in ad-
dition to currency and demand deposits, savings deposits, time de-
posits open account, and time certificates of deposits other than
negotiable time certificates of deposit issued in denominations of
$100,000 or more by large weekly reporting commercial banks; (3)
M3, which includes M2 plus the average of the beginning and end
of month deposits of mutual savings banks, savings and loan
shares, and credit union shares; (4) M4, which includes M2 plus
negotiable time certificates of deposit issued in denominations of
$100,000 or more; and (5) M5, which includes M3 plus negotiable
time certificates of deposit issued in denominations of $100,000 or
more.
34
As previously mentioned, Chairman Miller frowns upon the
potential swelling of the money supply. Although the fundamental
problems of the dollar are inflation and the trade deficit, Miller be-
lieves the number one priority is the reduction in the growth rate of
the money supply.35 Concern is primarily centered on targets
36 M l
and M2. For M 1, Miller, when he became Chairman, favored a 4%
to 6.5% annual increase; for M2 he favored a 6.5% to 9% annual
increase - ranges which contemplate that actual money supply
growth in 1978-79 will be lower than in 1977. The goal is to attain
32. Id. at 23.
33. Recently, another money stock measure was devised, designated "Ml plus" and is
defined as MI plus savings deposits at commercial banks, new accounts at banks and thrift
institutions, credit union share draft accounts, and demand deposits at mutual savings banks.
34. Fed. Res. Statistical Release H.6, table I (Aug. 3, 1978).
35. See Clark, Speaking of Business, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1978, at 16, col. 3.
36. The money supply targets are subject to change from time to time by the Federal
Reserve System in an effort to try to control the growth rate of the money supply - a key
factor involved in the fight against a spiraling inflation. Such targets, initially established by
Miller, have since been changed in keeping with the objectives of correlating the growth rate
of the money supply to the growth rate of the economy.
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reasonable price stability by pursuing a monetary policy aimed at
preventing increases in the growth of the money supply which fuel
inflation. The desirable policy is to bring the money supply down
to levels commensurate with the real growth rate of the economy.37
The dollar is recognized as the world's reserve currency and is
vital as an international medium of exchange. Foreign trade con-
tracts are often written in dollars even when United States citizens
are not involved. No less important is the dollar as an international
store of value. Foreign central banks hold total reserves valued at
$320 billion, of which $200 billion are held in United States dollars.
Deposits in the Eurodollar market approach $500 billion. These
holdings naturally give foreign governments and investors a huge
stake in the value of the United States dollar.
Professor Robert Triffin of Yale has pointed out that the fan-
tastic expansion of United States monetary growth preceded the oil
price explosion of 1973 and fueled the world-wide inflation of
which the higher oil price is only one and not the majority compo-
nent. Dollar reserves prior to 1973 had already more than doubled
by an amount exceeding all previous years and centuries. He cau-
tions that if such a process is not arrested it will continue to fuel
world inflation even if the energy problem could be solved to-
morrow.
Whether the steps to raise the federal funds and discount rates
really express a determination to slow the pace of dollar creation
remains to be seen. A serious effort to do that should also include
drastic controls over federal expenditures to curb the deficit and
facilitate monetary restraint. These are very real dangers which our
political leaders must confront.38
The argument has been made that oil imports are not the basic
cause of our inflationary problem. The rationale is that the dollar
has been plunging against the Japanese yen; yet it is noted that
United States oil imports amount to 19% of its energy consumption,
while Japan's oil imports amount to 73% of its energy consumption.
These statistics are offered to prove that our oil imports do not con-
stitute the major factor in our inflation problem. Rather, it is ar-
gued that the flight from the dollar is the nagging cause of our
problem, and that the dollar fell not primarily because the United
States imported too much oil but because the United States created
too many dollars. If the dollar is sliding, the warning signal, we are
37. Levine, supra note 4.
38. See Review & Outlook. A Reserve Currency, Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
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told, is that we are creating too many dollars. However desirable a
better energy policy would be, the argument persists that the essen-
tial step in defending the dollar is a more restrained monetary pol-
icy.
39
The wide differences in views concerning the inflation problem
is further illustrated by Chairman Miller's recent remarks that the
dollar's decline against the yen represents a breakout of the yen
rather than a decline of the dollar. He said the yen is appreciating
because of the very high Japanese balance-of-payments surplus.
He counseled that what the United States must do is to reduce its
inflation rate and pare back its current-account deficit. When that
happens, he said, we will have a stable dollar again.' As helpful as
the diagnosis may be in the long run, immediate curative proce-
dures are not specified.
Irwin L. Kellner, Economist for the Manufacturers Hanover
Trust Company, stated in the Bank's Summer 1978 Business Re-
port that, "there is only one way to cure inflation once and for all
and that it is for the Federal Reserve to slow the pace of money
creation." Kellner contends that the only fundamental cause of in-
flation is too much money entering the economy chasing too few
goods; that is, demand-pull inflation. He points out that the money
supply has grown faster than the Federal Reserve's public an-
nounced targets. He points out further that in the recent past alone
(May-June 1978) the growth rate of the money supply, MI, ex-
ceeded 12%. He states that notwithstanding President Carter's
good intentions to cut back on government spending, he runs into
enormous political pressures aimed at reinstating the funds he
would like to cut out. These pressures come from congressmen
whose areas would be affected or from the constituents themselves.
In other words, people are willing to fight inflation and reduce the
cost of government by tightening belts as long as it is someone else's
belt.
President Carter has become gravely concerned about the
sharp decline in the dollar in the foreign exchange markets and the
effect which the devaluation of the dollar has upon inflation. He
has therefore asked Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal and
Chairman Miller to consider what actions4' might be appropriate
and to recommend future actions the President might take regard-
39. Review & Outlook: A Dollar Primer, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1978, at 12, col. 1.
40. Miller Finds Japan's Yen Overvalued, Int'l Herald Tribune, Aug. 1, 1978, at 9, ol. 6.
41. See pp. 367-68 infra.
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ing the dollar.42 Carter is supposed to have misread the dollar's
link to inflation and the trade gap despite the warnings sounded
late last year about the virulence of inflation and the potential dan-
gers of the trade deficit - the two underlying forces behind the
dollar's weakness. Stated as a formula: inflation + trade deficit =
dollar's weakness.
Addressing the inflation component in the formula, we return
to the problem of the money supply: "[m]any currency traders view
excessive growth of the money supply as one of the main inflation
contributors because it leads to a situation where too much money
is chasing too few goods. An increase in interest rates is a way of
checking monetary expansion."43 The currency market traders also
urge a policy of toughness of government spending and more rigor-
ous standards for wage and price behavior - shades of TIP."
The Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis suggests that the
Federal Reserve should announce and stick to a policy of bringing
the inflation rate down to a specified level by gradually reducing
the growth rate of the money supply. Mark H. Willes, President of
the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank, says it offers the best
chance of avoiding a severe recession in the near future. Addition-
ally, Willes believes that more emphasis should be placed upon
microeconomics as distinguished from macroeconomics. The for-
mer relates to the behavior of businesses and individuals in the
economy, while the latter is a study of gross national product, un-
employment, and the other aggregates, together with reasons for
their movements. The key element in Willes' approach is referred
to as "rational expectations," which is explained as follows:
In an everyday, practical sense rational expectations is sim-
ply an assumption about people's behavior. The assumption
claims that people make economic decisions in a way that tends
to take into account all available information bearing signifi-
cantly on the future consequences of their decisions. And they
tend to use that information in a way so as not to repeat their
past mistakes.
This information .. . can include, among other things,
knowledge about government policy actions already taken and
about strategies or approaches government policy makers regu-
larly take when economic signals begin to change. So, rational
42. Dollar Surges as White House Breaks Silence, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1978, at 3. col. 1.
43. Farnsworth, Carter Misread Dollar's Link to Inflation, Trade Gap, Int'l Herald Trib-
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expectations attribute to people a reasonably thorough, broad-
view approach to appraising the future on matters that are going
to make a big dollar-and-cents difference to them.
Stated that way the concept hardly seems astonishing. Yet
consider what it can do to standard economic theory.
Suppose the economy is weak. The Federal Reserve seeks
to stimulate business by pumping more money into the economy.
Prices rise, but workers go on accepting largely unchanged
wages. Businessmen see increased profit opportunities so they
expand, hiring more workers.
That's the conventional scenario. The rational expectation-
ists say that workers are too perceptive to swallow it. Instead
the workers quickly begin demanding higher wages to offset pro-
spective higher prices.
So what can a policy maker do? The Minneapolis Fed sug-
gests that the Federal Reserve might announce, and stick to, a
policy of bringing the inflation rate down to a specified low level
by gradually reducing the growth rate of the money supply. The
bank concedes that this would require a period of adjustment,
but Mr. Willes says he thinks it offers the best chance of avoid-
ing a severe recession in the not distant future.4"
Professor Milton Friedman's views, commonly referred to as
the "monetarist approach," although highly regarded, have not
been put into practice by most economists or the Federal Reserve.
Professor Friedman poses a dilemma. He states that if the money
growth is accelerated, the result might be double-digit inflation. He
also states that if the money growth is decelerated we will probably
have a recession in late 1978 or in early 1979. Thus, he argues that
whatever we do will produce a severe recession later and that a
recession can be postponed only at the cost of increased inflation.
Professor Friedman goes further and pleads for a constitutional
limit on spending. He was a strong supporter of California's Pro-
position 13, which drastically limits property taxes. As the leading
exponent of monetarism, he emphasizes that moderate changes in
the growth rate of the money supply are the main determinants of
economic trends, and contends that because economic changes lag
so far behind the money growth fluctuations, the best the Federal
Reserve can do in its monetary policy is to promote the steady
moderate growth of the money supply. Chairman Miller's ap-
proach is to adjust monetary policy on a pragmatic basis; that is, try
45. Clark, Speaking of Business, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1978, at 18, col. 3.
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to deal with conditions as they change from time to time.46
III. FOREIGN REACTIONS
More than $500 billion are held by European central banks
and other European financial institutions. This amount currently
exceeds the M I money stock in the United States and is slightly less
than one-half of the total of the M I and M2 money stock. Dollars
were accumulated abroad in order to maintain the value of Euro-
pean currencies, which eventually would have affected their export
industries; that is, large quantities of dollars held by the private
sector would have depressed the dollar value and depreciated the
local currency value. To meet this situation the central banks used
the dollars accumulated by them to buy United States treasury se-
curities. During the period of such purchase of treasury securities
by foreign central banks, interest rates in the United States tend to
be lower than they otherwise would be, exemplifying the law of
supply and demand.47 However, in mid-September of 1978, the
Federal Reserve tightened credit controls by increasing the federal
funds rate, which triggered a rise in interest rates across the board
with a resultant increase of the prime rate to 9.5%. European reac-
tion to this situation has been sternly critical of the mode in which
the United States handles its affairs.
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt criticized Carter's policies and re-
buked Congress and the United States business community for al-
lowing an "irresponsible" oil import policy and for neglecting
American leadership in economics. Schmidt said that he was as-
tounded that the United States - with the world's strongest econ-
omy - is producing a balance of trade deficit which has a serious
effect on the dollar. He stated that the dollar's erratic movement on
the international money markets will stop only if oil imports are
cut. A contrary view has been expressed. In a recent article,48 Stu-
art Van Dyke, Jr., justified the United States policy of oil imports
by pointing out that the United States has an area of 3,000,000
square miles compared with West Germany's 94,000 square miles,
and that climate conditions and public transportation requirements
46. Clark, Monetary Maverick. Milton Friedman, Man of Many Roles Now Is a Tax
Revolutionary, Will St. J., July 17, 1978, at I, col. 1.
47. Allan, Foreign Bankers Reduce Holdings in Treasury Issues, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21,
1978, at D-l, col. 4.
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in the United States compel a greater need for sources of energy.
Schmidt's views prompted him to talk about the need for Western
Europe to work out its own economic problems without the help of
the United States. Specifically, he subscribed to the idea of a West-
ern Europe basket of currencies as a means to bypass dependence
on the United States .dollar as the basic internationl reserve cur-
rency.49
Joining Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his critical views is
West German Economics Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff, who
urged the United States as the world's banker to put its financial
house in order. He noted the need to curb inflation and to adopt an
energy program, pointing out that no other currency can take over
the international reserve role of the United States dollar. He em-
phasized that neither the deutschemark or any other European cur-
rency nor the yen is in a position to take on the role of an
international reserve currency in place of the dollar. He said fur-
ther that, as a result of the dollar's decline, West Germany and Ja-
pan are experiencing difficulties in their foreign trade despite the
cheaper prices they now pay for raw materials 0
French President Valrry Giscard d'Estaing maintains that sub-
stantial reduction in United States oil imports is a precondition for
an improvement in the world economy. He has expressed impa-
tience with the inaction of the United States Congress, many mem-
bers of which are opposed to higher priced oil which would result
from import cutting, particularly when faced with midyear elec-
tions. He maintains that any Senate efforts to strip the President of
his powers to tax imported oil would leave the President a workable
alternative, that is, setting the quotas by administrative action as
distinguished from an import fee, which would require congres-
sional approval. European countries with successful export indus-
tries - for example, West Germany - argue that the falling dollar
is forcing up the value of their currencies and is thus squeezing
their profitability.
5'
The devaluation of the dollar has caused Europe to come forth
with self-protective measures. The weaker the dollar grows, the
more Europeans tend to look to themselves for getting currency
49. Chancellor Schmidt Criticizes Congress and U.S Business, Wall St. J., May 1, 1978,
at 23, col. 4.
50. German Official Chides U.S. on Its Inflation Curbs, Wash. Post, Sept. 1, 1978, at 1-5,
col. 1.
51. Lewis, Giscard Oil Warnings to Carter, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1978, at D3, col. 1.
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matters in order. Most European planners share a desire to protect
the dollar, and they believe that creation of a strong, all-European
currency would relieve some of the worldwide financial responsibil-
ities that now put pressure on the dollar. Similarly, European
financial leaders have vowed not to support any system that could
hurt the United States currency.
2
In the quest for financial self-preservation, new phrases have
come upon the scene, such as "basket of currencies" and "cocktail
of currencies." Various devices have been suggested such as the
European Unit of Account (EUA). EUA is a basket of European
currencies used in computing certain market transactions such as
credit arrangements and intergovernmental dealings which would
be based on the EUA rather than the dollar. It is really a symbolic
statement of independence rather than a precisely formulated
financial medium with wide potential use. 3
H. Johannes Witteveen, former Managing Director of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF), offered a helpful explanation of
the function of Special Drawing Rights:
Central banks that have accumulated surplus dollars could
turn them in to the Fund and get the equivalent in Special Draw-
ing Rights. While holding the SDRs, the central banks would
continue to be credited with the interest from dollars they could
be earning, for instance, from investments in the United States
Treasury securities.
Created 10 years ago, Special Drawing Rights represent a
market basket of currencies, which nations hold as reserves
along with gold bullion and dollars to settle their international
accounts. One SDR unit is worth $1.22.
There are already some $10 billion of these units, along with
$90 billion of dollar assets and, at current prices, some $175 bil-
lion of gold included in the reserve assets of nations.
As the SDRs expunge the dollars, there would simply be an
adjustment in the composition of this international liquidity and
not an increase.
The plan can go nowhere without United States approval,
since any creation of SDRs requires an 85 percent majority vote
in the International Monetary Fund, and the United States alone
can muster 20 percent, more than enough to block the plan (pur-
52. Shaky Dollar Aids Europe Currency Plan, Int'l Herald Tribune, Aug. 22, 1978, at i,
col. 1; Carr, Defending Europe Against Vagaries of the Dollar, Financial Times (London),
Sept. 19, 1978, at 14, col. 1.
53. Spivak, Western European Nations Seek Stability In Currencies Via United States
Money Policy, Wall St. J., Apr. 24, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
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suant to Article XV, Section 2 of the Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund).54
Japan's Minister of Economic Affairs, Nobuhike Ushiba,
points to the weakness of the dollar and offers the standard pre-
scription that the United States should curb its inflation and its ap-
petite for energy. Ushiba is apprehensive that in the present
disordered state of the world economy, nations are tempted to take
protectionist measures with a ruinous impact on world trade. He
says Japan's aims are to reduce its trade surplus and to expand
more rapidly its domestic economy. To attain the growth goal, a
program of public works will be initiated. This approach has been
criticized by outside economists and is likely to do little for Japa-
nese import demand compared with what tax cuts for consumers
would do. Ushiba counters with the argument that his country-
men's savings rate is more than 25%, so that even if there is a tax
cut the consumer will put the extra money into savings.55
A. Summit Meeting
In mid-July of 1978 the Western industrial nations met in
Bonn to pledge steps each would take to implement promises of
economic expansion. If the pledges are carried out, it is estimated
that the average annual rate of economic growth for the twenty-
four member nations of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) will have climbed back toward the
4.5% level at which unemployment ceases to rise. West Germany
pledged to stimulate its economy by up to 1% of the gross national
product - about $6 billion - and said that it was near agreement
on a package of tax cuts, investment aids, and increased family al-
lowances. The United States pledged to reduce oil imports. Some
doubt was expressed as to whether the West German measures, as
well as those of the United States and other participating countries,
will be accepted by the legislatures of the nations involved.
All of the pledges made at Bonn were quite vague and quali-
fied, and OECD officials remain skeptical about the West's ability
to carry out all the pledges made. For instance, the OECD assumes
prompt passage by the West German Parliament of the 1% stimulus
package, and while the government is apparently making strides on
54. Famsworth, U.S Resisting Wilteveen's Plan For Supplanting Surplus Dollars, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 24, 1978, at DI, col. 4.
55. Silk, Growing Japanese Concern Over Worldwide Depression, N.Y. Times, May 9,
1978, at 53, col. 2.
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putting together that package, the opposition party controls the Up-
per House that must approve it.
The OECD also assumed that Japan will be able to raise its
economic growth rate to 9% during the first half of 1979 in order to
meet its pledge to achieve a 7% growth rate during the coming fiscal
year. In Japan, as the dollar slid to another postwar low against the
yen, the Government announced a supplementary budget designed
to help it meet its growth goals.
The one exception to the call for growth is the United States,
where growth is already high relative to the other member nations.
The OECD argues that Washington should accept a slowdown next
year to combat inflation and curb the enormous payments deficit
that is depressing the value of the dollar.56 In mid-August of 1978,
Japan announced that it may not be able to keep the key promise
made at the Summit Conference in Bonn, that is, maintain a na-
tional growth rate of 7% in fiscal 1978.17 At a still later date the
Japanese government disclosed that it would introduce additional
budgetary measures aimed at keeping the economy moving toward
the previously announced growth rate target of 7%. These budget-
ary commitments are not only for "roads and highways but also for
restructuring industries, creating new employment, and improving
the quality of life."58 Apparently in anticipation of the growth pro-
gram, Japan's central bank has begun to accept bids to buy gover-
ment bonds from 416 banks, credit associations, and securities
firms.
5 9
B. OPEC and the Dollar
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
60
is gravely concerned about the declines in the exchange value of
their substantial oil export earnings, as well as the erosion of their
dollar-denominated assets. The actual losses resulting from the
56. Carter Officials May Be Too Optimistic About Growth, OECD Says, Wall St. J., July
26, 1978, at 5, col 1.
57. Scott-Stokes, Growth Target Is Seen Eluding Japan, Int'l Herald Tribune, Aug. 19-
20, 1978, at 7, col. 3.
58. Japan Plans To Disclose More Budgetary Steps To Increase Growth, Wall St. J., Aug.
28, 1978, at 22, col. 4; Scott-Stokes, Japan Approves Measures To Spur Sagging Economy,
Int'l Herald Tribune, Sept. 4, 1978, at 5, col. 1.
59. Tharp, Japan Unveils New Stimulative Package in Bidfor Goal of 7% Economic
Growth, Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1978, at 6, col. 1.
60. Major Middle East OPEC countries include: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Abu
Dhabi, UAE and Qatar, other OPEC countries are: Venezuela, Nigeria, Libya, Indonesia,
Algeria, Gabon, and Ecuador.
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dollar depreciation are not easy to assess because of the different
uses to which the dollar-denominated assets are put, - i e. the
purchase of United States governmental securities or their import-
ing purchase needs. The various suggestions made to date by the
oil ministers of the OPEC countries are concerned with a variety of
currency baskets. On close analysis of the currencies comprising
the different baskets, it has been virtually impossible to reach a con-
sensus among the OPEC countries as to which basket would be the
fairest and most workable for the countries involved. The dilemma
confronting the OPEC countries was candidly stated by Jahangir
Amuzegar, Executive Director of the IMF:
[A]ny change of the oil-pricing formula away from the dollar
when the dollar is weak is likely to further erode world confi-
dence in the U.S. currency and to add to its downward pressures
(citation omitted). The dollar's plunge following the switch may
help boost oil exporters' receipts from immediate oil shipments;
but it would also further depreciate their huge dollar balances,
and would thus certainly be resisted by surplus members. This is
perhaps a major reason why Saudi Arabia has so far objected to
any switch from the existing dollar system.
61
The United States Treasury has opposed any shift by OPEC from
the dollar pricing.62
Amuzegar also makes the point that the drop in the dollar
value aggravates inflation in the United States and has a rather
slow beneficial effect on America's balance of trade. In essence,
with gold out of the monetary system and the SDRs not yet firmly
in place, the present order is in practice a dollar standard under
which the United States shares the control of world liquidity with
some other major currency centers, the international private bank-
ing community, and the IMF.63 By any measure, the United States
dollar is the world's most outstanding currency due to the sheer size
of the United States economy and also because the dollar is now
virtually the international system's main means of payment and its
principal reserve asset. Amuzegar points out, however, the vulnera-
bility which "is the mirror of America's underlying economic con-
ditions, e.g., the rate of domestic inflation, the size of the budget
gap, the deficits in the balance of trade and payments, the cyclical
trend of the economy, and above all the structural competitiveness
61. Amuzegar, OPEC and the Dollar Dilemma, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 745 (July 1978).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 746.
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of U.S. industries."' He remarks:
The 1976-78 "dollar debacle" is chiefly attributed to the
U.S. huge oil imports ($45 billion in 1977), balance-of-trade gap
($29 billion), and balance-of-payments deficit ($20 billion). Ac-
tually it has been the product of a complex set of factors: a faster
U.S. growth rate compared to its main trading partners; two
mammoth budgetary deficits ($60 billion each) in 1977 and
1978;65 phenomenal increases in the trade surpluses of Japan
and Germany (both, ironically, more dependent on foreign oil
than the United States); the specter of another round of domestic
inflation in the American economy in 1978; and a growing
worldwide lack of confidence in the dollar's future - based on
the real or imaginary belief that the United States is neither will-
ing nor able to stem the dollar's fall.66
"Only a sharp cut in oil imports could provide a quick effective
cure for the dollar. ' 67 Amuzegar impliedly suggests that most other
efforts made to date, well-intentioned as they have been, do not go
to the heart of the problem.
Faced with these unhappy choices, a host of other sugges-
tions have been offered by economists and businessmen to prop
up the ailing dollar. These measures have included the sale by
the U.S. Treasury of foreign-currency-denominated bonds in or-
der to engage in more aggressive market interventions; larger
currency swap arrangements with foreign central banks; the use
of IMF credit, and the sale of Treasury gold in the open market.
Supplementing these "quick-fire" actions have been suggestions
regarding the need for: the passage of an effective U.S. energy
conservation and production program; a convincing anti-infla-
tion policy; new tax and welfare policies that could reduce un-
employment through increased business investment instead of
public work programs; and innovative measures to improve
dwindling American competitiveness in some key industries.68
France and West Germany, evincing an impatience with the
"dollar problem" and the questionable status of the dollar as the
desirable reserve asset, have resolved to take action as a self-protec-
tive measure for the European economy. On September 16, 1978,
they announced they would work on a proposed new European
Monetary System (EMS) aimed at bringing greater exchange rate
64. Id. at 747.
65. The books have not yet been closed on the United States deficit for 1978, which will
be less than $60 billion.
66. Amuzegar, supra note 61, at 747.




California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol9/iss2/3
INFLATION
stability in Europe. It is contemplated that Community leaders
may decide in December 1978 on the establishment of the system.69
It is reported that agreement had been reached in three areas: the
kind of unit to be used at the core of the system; intervention pol-
icy; and the size and scope of the planned new European monetary
fund. A round of discussion with Community partners is planned
for the near future. A key point of difference between the West
German and French approach is rumored to have been resolved.
West Germany and other members of the present "snake"7 cur-
rency system generally favor a fixed yardstick against which the
movements of the participating currencies would be measured.
France, apparently supported by Britain and Italy, seemed initially
to prefer a continually altering yardstick based on a basket of cur-
rencies. However, it is hoped that after a discussion is held with
Community partners, perhaps these opposing views will be re-
solved. Developments of this proposal will bear watching, for it is
significantly indicative of the steps West Germany and France are
taking as leaders to challenge the United States dollar as the sole
reserve currency of the International Monetary System.7'
These new developments in Europe initiated by Giscard
d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt suggest the fulfillment of a proph-
ecy:
The old order changeth, yielding place to new, And God fulfills
himself in many ways, Lest one good custom should corrupt the
world.72
IV. THE NEW DETERMINED EFFORT
The United States has been criticized, worldwide, for ineptly
managing its economy. West Germany, France, Japan, and Swit-
zerland have been its major critics. Their complaint is that, in the
69. To date, however, the EMS has reached an impasse because of basic differences on
the price of farm products. The EMS, spearheaded by France and West Germany, as of this
writing, comprises also Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, and It-
aly. The United Kingdom has deferred its decision to join, subject to resolving internal
factional differences.
70. The "snake" is the current European currency arrangement: currencies are set at
fixed rates and float against each other within a narrow band - a so-called parity grid.
71. Carr, Giscard and Schmidt Settle Diflerences, Financial Times (London), Sept. 16,
1978, at 1, col. 7. See also Jonquieres & Riddell, 4 European Monetary System. Condemned
to Succeed, Financial Times (London), Sept. 18, 1978, at 14, col. 3. Jonquieres, EEC Ex-
change-Rate Compromise Leaves U.K. As Sole Opponent, Financial Times (London), Sept.
19, 1978, at 1, col. 3. Riddell, The Pound in Your Pocket, Financial Times (London), Sept.
20, 1978, at 20, col. I.
72. Alfred Lord Tennyson, "Morte d'Arthur."
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wake of a spiraling inflation, the United States dollar has been
measurably weakened in relation to the deutschemark, the French
franc, the Swiss franc, and the Japanese yen. The administration,
painfully aware of the dollar's plight, launched a major new initia-
tive on November 1, 1978. Alfred E. Kahn was named anti-infla-
tion chief. Mr. Kahn is addressing his attention to the guidelines
for wage and salary increases of 7% and a price guideline that gen-
erally would permit price increases up to 1/2 of 1% less than the
increases put through in 1976 and 1977. Relaxation of these stand-
ards has already taken place in response to the objections of the
labor and business sectors of the economy. It is contemplated that
in administering the guidelines program, a flexible approach will be
employed.
An ingenious ingredient of the newly introduced program is
the proposal made that wages and salaries will be "insured" against
the effects of inflation. Groups of workers who agree to accept
from their employer a pay increase that falls within the 7% guide-
line would be eligible for a tax credit equal to the amount by which
their pay increase falls below the inflation rate; that is, workers will
be compensated in effect for price increases which exceed pay in-
creases. Just as in the case of wage and salary controls during
World War II, the proposed guidelines, which are not controls, will
have to be implemented by numerous interpretations and regula-
tions to accommodate them to different situations. Organized labor
is opposed to the guidelines and prefers wage and price controls,
apparently on the theory that the best protection for employees is to
place a ceiling on prices so that the real wage can be maintained.73
The broadside launched by the administration extends beyond
the wage-price spiral. It includes within its thrust an all-out effort
to strengthen the dollar in foreign exchange markets. To this end,
President Carter requested Chairman Miller and Treasury Secre-
tary Blumenthal to study the problem and make recommendations.
This phase of the "New Determined Effort" is in full swing.
The Federal Reserve Board has announced: (1) approval of a
one percentage point increase in the discount rate at Federal Re-
serve Banks from 8-1/2% to 9-1/2% - a further step which will
diminish the amount of borrowings of member banks from the
Federal Reserve and contribute to reducing the growth rate of the
money supply; (2) establishment of a supplementary reserve re-
73. See T. Gaines, The New Policy Initiatives, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Eco-
nomic Report 1 (Nov. 1978).
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quirement, in addition to existing reserve requirements, equal to 2%
of time deposits in denominations of $100,000 or more - a step
which, together with the increase of the discount rate, should in-
crease the incentive for member banks to borrow funds from
abroad and strengthen the dollar in foreign markets; and (3) in-
creases in the Federal Reserve Reciprocal Currency (SWAP) ar-
rangements with the central banks of West Germany, Japan, and
Switzerland by $7.6 billion to $15 billion - a step which permits
the purchase and reduction of the supply of dollars in the world in
the international exchange markets.74
In turn, the Treasury, to augment the measures taken by the
Federal Reserve Board, has announced: (1) the issuance of up to
$10 billion of Treasury securities denominated in foreign currencies
intended primarily for sale to private foreigners - a step to make
foreign currency available to the Treasury; (2) drawing $3 billion in
foreign currencies from its reserves at the IMF and selling $2 bil-
lion of its IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) for foreign curren-
cies; and (3) increasing its gold sales to at least 1.5 million ounces
monthly beginning in December 1978, up from 300,000 ounces cur-
rently and about double the previously announced level of 750,000
ounces that was to have begun in November of 1978.
The currencies acquired from the IMF, the sale of SDRs, and
the issuance of foreign currencies denominated securities - to-
gether with amounts available through the Federal Reserve swap
lines - provide up to $30 billion in foreign currencies for support
operations in exchange markets.
The goal of these measures is to reverse the decline in the dol-
lar's value abroad. By showing an intention to support the dollar,
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve hope to stem unwarranted
diversification out of dollars by private and official foreigners. In
the long run, the recovery of the dollar will depend on actions by
the government to change underlying inflationary expectations.75
It is hoped that a combination of the proposed guidelines rela-
tive to wages and prices and the aggressive steps taken by the Fed-
eral Reserve Board and the Treasury will be the felicitious mix that
will have a restraining effect on spiraling inflation and will enhance
the value of the dollar in relation to foreign currencies in the inter-
national exchange markets.
74. See VOICE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, FEDERAL RESERVE AND
TREASURY SUPPORT THE DOLLAR 1-2 (Nov. 1978).
75. Id at 3-5.
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V. CONCLUSION
It must be apparent to the reader that no one has yet come
forth with a quick and easy solution to the global enigma of infla-
tion. At this juncture, therefore, it is still a riddle to be solved. Cer-
tainly there is no dearth of trained talent analyzing and suggesting
ways out of the morass. Fifty years ago, John Maynard Keynes
said that the inflationary process "engages all the hidden forces of
economic law on the side of destruction and does it in a manner
which not one man in a million is able to diagnose."76 More opti-
mistic and hopeful is the approach of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development spearheaded by West
Germany and France. At the mid-July 1978 summit meeting in
Bonn, all the countries attending pledged to take appropriate steps
in an effort to stem the tide of the inflationary flow. It would be
ironic if future historians should record that men were able to avoid
a nuclear holocaust but floundered in solving the plaguing puzzle-
ment of money supply, inflation, currency valuations, and the other
macroeconomic concepts which beset our industrial world.
76. J.M. KEYNES, Inflation and Deflation, in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 78 (1932).
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